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Discovery lies at the very heart of sci-
entifi c endeavor. It heralds progress, 
the march of science in uncovering the 
mysteries of the world that surrounds 
us. But how do discoveries come about? 
“By observation, of course” is the simple 
answer, nature being an open book with 
new discoveries beckoning at every call. 
This attitude, the curiosity and desire 
to observe nature in her original form, 
turned naturalists into explorers. In the 
early days of oceanography, these brave 
souls travelled far and wide in search of 
exotic creatures and plants, marvelling 
at their beauty and diversity. Yet today, 
such a cavalier approach is likely to be 
frowned upon, particularly by the phi-
losophers of science. They emphasize 
the importance of hypothesis-driven 
research, in which questions are formu-
lated and then subject to test by experi-
ment. Observation is subordinate. In 
this article I will elaborate these issues 
and argue that, despite the criticisms of 
the philosophers, observation is an es-
sential prerequisite to identifying and 
understanding the complex patterns 
and trends of variability in the ocean. 
It is therefore central to the progress of 
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oceanography today, complemented by 
hypothesis-driven studies focusing on 
cause and effect. 
EARLY EXPLOR ATION AND 
INDUCTION
The Challenger Expedition of 1872 to 
1876 is often proclaimed as the birth 
of oceanography as an organized dis-
cipline. Led by the naturalist Charles 
Wyville Thomson, it had the aim of “ex-
amination of the physical and biological 
conditions of the deep sea throughout 
the great ocean basins” (Thomson and 
Murray, 1885, p. 1). Lasting three and 
a half years and covering 68,690 miles, 
this pioneering voyage gave Thomson 
the ideal opportunity to explore the deep 
sea, which he described as “the land of 
promise for the naturalist, the only re-
maining region where there were end-
less novelties of extraordinary interest 
ready to the hand which had the means 
of gathering them” (Thomson, 1874, p. 
49). The fi rst systematic record of cur-
rents, temperatures, and depths of the 
world’s oceans was made on this expe-
dition, as well as the discovery of more 
than 4000 new species in net trawls. A set 
of fi fty volumes, the Challenger Reports, 
was completed in 1895, documenting the 
hydrography, botany, zoology and bot-
tom sediments encountered throughout 
the voyage. Thomson’s predecessor, Ed-
ward Forbes, summed up the spirit of 
adventure and discovery in these early 
oceanographers: “Beneath the waves, 
there are many dominions yet to be vis-
ited, and kingdoms to be discovered; 
and he who venturously brings up from 
the abyss enough of their inhabitants to 
display the physiognomy of the country, 
will taste that cup of delight, the sweet-
ness of whose draught those only who 
have made a discovery know” (Forbes 
and Godwin-Austen, 1859, p. 11). 
The early days of oceanography thus 
had a strong emphasis on the collection 
and cataloguing of facts, from which 
generalizations and the development of 
theory could arise. This process is known 
as induction, the scientifi c method 
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championed by the seventeenth century 
philosopher Francis Bacon. Science is 
then a critical and analytical activity, as 
summed up by Karl Pearson: “The hard 
and stony path of classifying facts and 
reasoning upon them is the only way 
to ascertain truth” (Pearson, 1892, p. 
20). This view of scientifi c method was 
prominent among both philosophers and 
scientists until the early part of the twen-
tieth century. Since then, various distin-
guished philosophers, notably Bertrand 
Russell and Karl Popper, as well as many 
practicing scientists and in particular the 
immunologist Peter Medawar (who was 
also an accomplished philosopher), have 
emphasized instead the virtue of hy-
pothesis-driven research. Induction has 
been criticized on a number of grounds. 
First, inductive arguments are subject to 
uncertainty (i.e., can never be proven, 
and so cannot be justifi ed by logic). For 
example, if we assert inductively that fl a-
mingos are pink on the basis of millions 
of observations, this does not mean that 
all fl amingos, present and future, are or 
will be necessarily pink. Second, induc-
tion, at least in its simplest form, suppos-
edly starts with unprejudiced, innocent 
observation of facts. But, as it is fashion-
able to claim, observations are them-
selves based on ideas or theories, i.e., 
they are “theory-laden.” Popper empha-
sized this point by beginning a lecture 
to a group of physics students by saying: 
“Take a pencil and paper; carefully ob-
serve, and write down what you have ob-
served!” The students asked in turn what 
he wanted them to observe, Popper con-
cluding that the instruction “Observe!” 
is absurd (Popper, 1963, p. 46). Third, it 
can be argued that collections of obser-
vations cannot lead to knowledge unless 
they are linked together, usually inferring 
causal mechanism, requiring creativity 
and imagination rather than simple de-
duction. Realizing this, the philosopher 
William Whewell advocated an advanced 
form of induction utilizing conceptions 
akin to hypotheses to aid discovery: “Be-
fore the inductive truth is detected, the 
facts are there, but they are many and 
unconnected. The conception which the 
discoverer applies to them gives them 
connection and unity” (Whewell, 1840, 
p.42). The American philosopher George 
Gale emphasized the importance of ad-
dressing cause, labelling science based on 
generalizations of data “cookbook sci-
ence,” and proposing that only if we go 
on to show why regularities exist can we 
progress to “explanatory science” (Gale, 
1979, p. 65). Without addressing cause, 
Gale likened science to following recipes 
in a cookbook.
HYPOTHESIS ,  IMAGINATION, 
AND UNIVER SAL LAWS
Hypothesis-driven research, the alterna-
tive to induction, supposedly begins with 
a new idea conjured from the imagina-
tion, which is then the subject of criti-
cal analysis via observation and experi-
ment. The resulting theories (a theory 
is a hypothesis or group of hypotheses 
that have withstood critical empirical 
testing) are described by Popper (1959, 
p. 59) as “nets cast to catch what we call 
‘the world’: to rationalize, to explain, and 
to master it.” Well-publicized hypoth-
esis-driven discoveries often originate as 
fl ashes of inspiration, a classic example 
being the discovery of the benzene ring 
in chemistry, postulated by Friedrich 
Kekulé in 1865. In an address to the 
German Chemical Society during 1890 
Kekulé recollected how, in a half-wak-
ing dream as he slumbered before the 
fi re, he had seen atoms “gambolling” 
before his eyes and thereby conceived 
that molecules of aromatic substances 
are formed of chains of atoms coiled in 
a ring. Continuing his lecture, he went 
on to proclaim “Let us learn to dream, 
gentlemen, then perhaps we shall fi nd 
the truth” (Japp, 1898, p.100). It was only 
some time after Kekulé’s discovery that 
chemists were able to establish the theo-
retical stability of the ring structure with 
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certainty. Another example, this time 
from the realm of physics, is the “plum-
pudding” model of the atom (e.g., Eis-
berg and Resnick 1974, p.95), proposed 
by John Joseph Thomson in 1898. In this 
model, clearly a conjecture of the imagi-
nation, electrons are scattered in a spher-
ical sea of positive charge, like plums in a 
pudding. The model was experimentally 
tested and disproved in 1911 by Ernest 
Rutherford, leading to the current theory 
that positive charge resides in the nuclei 
of atoms. In each case, the discovery was 
an act of mind, and the necessary facts 
for confi rmation obtained after the hy-
pothesis was conjectured.
The recent philosophical literature, 
with its emphasis on hypothesis, has 
been heavily infl uenced by the progress 
of physics and chemistry throughout 
history. There has been extensive analy-
sis of, for example, how Copernican as-
tronomy replaced the Ptolemaic system, 
the downfall of the phlogiston system 
of combustion, and the development 
of Newtonian mechanics and its subse-
quent modifi cation by Einstein. It ap-
pears that the supreme task of the physi-
cist is to arrive at universal elementary 
laws. Hypothesis, in conjunction with 
controlled experiment, may indeed be 
the primary means of making progress 
for this purpose, with induction being 
of little or no use. If, for example, one 
carefully kept a notebook full of the ex-
periences encountered in the course of 
daily life (i.e., simply collected observa-
tions), this would probably be of little or 
no value to physicists at all. As Toulmin 
(1953) has pointed out, discoveries in the 
physical sciences consist in the introduc-
tion of fresh ways of looking at phenom-
ena and in the application of new modes 
of representation, rather than in fi nding 
new generalizations. 
Marine systems are complex and con-
sequently, unlike the confi ned environ-
ment of a physics laboratory, it is inher-
ently diffi cult to undertake controlled 
experiments at sea in which only a single 
factor is varied in the face of all the other 
variables at Mother Nature’s command. 
Repeatability, a hallmark of ideal scien-
tifi c method, is likewise a real problem. 
Hypothesis testing does nevertheless 
have a major role to play in oceanog-
raphy, as in other scientifi c disciplines, 
providing a powerful tool for investigat-
ing cause and effect. One cannot after 
all simply observe the vertical velocities 
associated with coastal upwelling, that 
copepods grow best on a mixed diet, 
or that marine phytoplankton are the 
dominant source of methyl iodide to the 
atmosphere. A good example of the val-
ue of conjecture is provided by the “iron 
hypothesis” of John Martin, in which 
he proposed that iron defi ciency limits 
phytoplankton growth in the nutrient-
rich waters of the Antarctic and subarctic 
Pacifi c oceans (Martin and Fitzwater, 
1988). Various iron fertilization experi-
ments were subsequently undertaken to 
test this hypothesis, giving rise to artifi -
cially stimulated blooms of chlorophyll. 
It should be noted that even the early 
oceanographers were not entirely devoid 
of hypotheses when planning their ex-
peditions. For example, Edward Forbes 
is remembered for his azoic hypothesis, 
which stated that at depths greater than 
300 fathoms (600 m) the sea bottom be-
came a desolate wasteland, devoid of life, 
due to the immense pressure exerted by 
the water column above and lack of light. 
The bottom dredging work of the Chal-
lenger Expedition was able to test and 
disprove this hypothesis.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PATTERN
A glance at the scientifi c literature shows 
that the human capability for pattern 
recognition is deeply embedded in scien-
tifi c practice (Ziman, 1978). Unlike phys-
ics and chemistry, oceanography is not 
about discovering universal laws. But in-
stead, identifying and elaborating pattern 
is of greatest value, induction playing a 
central role. The ocean (climate) system 
can be characterized by modes that can 
be thought of as naturally occurring pat-
terns of variability, with each pattern 
exhibiting unique spatial characteristics 
but typically vague temporal character-
istics (Mantua et al., 2002). Examples 
include the El Niño Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO), the North Atlantic Oscillation 
(NAO), and the Antarctic Circumpolar 
Wave (ACW). Study of these patterns 
leads to suggestions of possible intercon-
nections between otherwise unrelated 
facts, providing the stimulus for ideas 
about what might or might not be im-
portant in terms of causal relationships. 
Examples include relationships among 
the biogeography of zooplankton in the 
Northeast Atlantic, sea surface tempera-
ture, and the NAO (Beaugrand and Reid, 
2003), and the effect of the ACW on eco-
logical interactions among ice, krill, and 
penguins in the Southern Ocean (Fraser 
and Hofmann, 2003). 
Patterns in the ocean are often com-
Oceanography  Vol.17, No.4, Dec. 2004 11
plex and subtle, and so a great deal of 
effort needs to go into “fact-gathering.” 
Fortunately, the last two decades has seen 
a revolution in the ability to observe the 
oceans on a global scale, driven in large 
part by the Tropical Ocean Global At-
mosphere Study (TOGA) and the World 
Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE) 
(Gould, 2003). These and other pro-
grams have led to the synthesis of vari-
ous global in situ and satellite-derived 
data sets, such as current directions and 
speeds, ocean color, nutrients, and CO2. 
An observational presence in the ocean 
is ongoing under the general umbrella 
of the Global Ocean Observing System 
(GOOS), which includes an ENSO ob-
serving system in the tropical Pacifi c and 
an array of drifting, profi ling fl oats as 
part of the Argo program. A promising 
development of recent times is the use of 
autonomous platforms, equipped with 
a variety of sensors, providing cost-ef-
fective monitoring capability (Perry and 
Rudnick, 2003). Initiatives such as the 
Ocean Research Interactive Observa-
tory Networks (ORION) are paving the 
way to obtain more and better data for 
processes that are rare and episodic, or 
that involve fl uctuations or trends over 
many years. The ORION project involves 
a combination of permanent moorings 
placed at strategic locations across the 
world’s oceans, a network of seafl oor 
cables, and coastal observatories. Such an 
intense effort will provide the means of 
detecting and forecasting ocean compo-
nents of climate variability. 
Scientists need to use their experience 
and intuition to greatest effect when de-
ciding upon what types of observations 
to make, bearing in mind that discover-
ies are often a result of new connections 
among facts. Diversity of measurements 
is important. If, for example, biogeo-
chemical cycles are of interest, then in-
dependent measurements of as many 
processes in the budgets as possible are 
desirable. Concentrated interdisciplin-
ary studies, an ongoing strength of the 
marine scientifi c community, are of the 
greatest benefi t in this respect. A fi ne 
example is the Joint Global Ocean Flux 
Study (JGOFS), which had as its aims to 
study on a global scale the processes con-
trolling the time-varying fl uxes of car-
bon and associated biogenic elements in 
the ocean, and predict their response to 
anthropogenic perturbation. The North 
Atlantic Bloom Experiment, part of 
JGOFS, typifi ed the cooperative spirit of 
marine scientists, combining U.S., Brit-
ish, German, Canadian, and Dutch ships. 
A series of stations along 20°W were oc-
cupied during 1989, and much learned 
about the factors controlling plankton 
community structure, the spring bloom, 
and drawdown of CO2 (Koeve and 
Ducklow, 2001). 
Patterns in the ocean are in a continual 
state of change, and so long-term records 
of relevant parameters are essential (Karl 
and Winn, 1991). Perhaps the jewels in 
the crown of oceanographic research 
during recent decades have been the 
JGOFS time-series stations, such as the 
Bermuda Atlantic Time Series and the 
Hawaiian Ocean Time series (HOT), that 
combine continuous records over many 
years and intensive sampling of numer-
ous variables of interest. Various impor-
tant and unexpected discoveries have en-
sued, such as the switch from the nitro-
gen-limited regime at HOT that prevailed 
before the 1980s to a phosphorus-limited 
regime in recent years (Karl, 1999).
FACTS MATTER
In order to elucidate pattern, there is an 
ongoing need to establish basic “facts,” 
such as the size and direction of currents, 
and the range and diversity of plant and 
animal life. Unlike physics, a notebook 
full of observations, such as the Chal-
lenger Reports, is now a good starting 
point as a source of knowledge. Pattern 
and process can only be established in 
context of this information. It has, how-
ever, been suggested that the end is in 
sight for science, in the sense that all the 
major discoveries may soon have been 
made (e.g., Glass, 1971; Horgan, 1998). Is 
fact-gathering nearing completion? Not 
in oceanography. Much of the ocean, in 
particular the murky deep waters, re-
mains largely unexplored. All manner 
of weird and wonderful animals inhabit 
this zone, such as the various predatory 
fi sh whose names alone are testament to 
their spectacular nature, including nib-
blers (e.g., hatchetfi sh and lanternfi sh), 
stalkers (e.g., the dragonfi sh), ambushers 
(e.g., the anglerfi sh) and hunters (e.g., 
the fangtooth fi sh) (Robison, 1978). 
Countless other deep-sea and benthic 
animals as yet await our discovery. The 
decline in funding for taxonomy (God-
fray, 2002) is particularly worrying in 
this respect. 
Ever-improving technology contin-
ues to open our eyes to new worlds of 
discovery. New types of measurements 
are always important. For example, in 
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recent decades various developments 
have led to revelations of hitherto un-
imaginable microbial life in the ocean. 
In 1988, Sally Chisholm discovered the 
cyanobacterium Prochlorococcus using 
fl ow cytometry (Chisholm et al., 1988), 
a method in which cells pass through a 
laser beam, and analysis of the result-
ing light scattering allows identifi cation 
of different plankton groups in terms of 
size and pigment content. Prochlorococcus 
has abundances of up to 20,000 cells per 
drop of seawater, leading Richard Barber 
of the Duke University Marine Labora-
tory to ponder that, “It’s hard to believe 
we’d overlooked something so important 
for so long” (quoted from Nadir, 2003, 
p. 27). Molecular techniques, such as 
cloning and analyzing RNA sequences, 
have similarly uncovered new horizons. 
A good example is the discovery that Ar-
chaea (a group of microbes characterized 
by unusual genetic and molecular struc-
tures distinct from other forms of life) 
are widespread throughout the ocean, 
rather than being restricted to anaerobic 
sediments, hydrothermal vents, and high-
ly saline, landlocked seas (DeLong, 1992).
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Observation and hypothesis play com-
plementary roles in the progress of 
oceanography today. The former leads to 
the discovery of pattern, providing the 
context for focussed, hypothesis-driven, 
process studies. There is no single meth-
odology in science. What, then, of the 
philosophers’ criticisms of the inductive 
method? First, just because induction 
cannot be fully justifi ed in logic does 
not mean that it is not of great service to 
scientists, who realize that knowledge is 
always subject to possible revision in the 
light of new evidence. Second, regarding 
the theory-ladenness of observation, it is 
true that we cannot simply “browse over 
the fi eld of nature like cows at pasture” 
(Medawar, 1969, p. 29). Oceanography is 
not about randomly observing anything 
and everything in an ad hoc manner, but 
instead requires a systematic and con-
sidered approach. It is “focused explora-
tion” (Roger Larson, University of Rhode 
Island, Narragansett, Rhode Island, 
personal communication, 2004). But by 
“focused,” this does not necessarily mean 
hypothesis-driven. As the philosopher 
Ian Hacking has pointed out, there is 
a difference between having some idea 
(i.e., using one’s intuition) about the 
general properties of a system thus indi-
cating the types of observations that are 
likely to be useful, and making observa-
tions in response to a precise conjecture 
about the phenomena under scrutiny 
(Hacking, 1983). Third, Whewell’s asser-
tion that creativity, in essence intuition 
or hypothesis, is required in order to elu-
cidate pattern is valid, but his advanced 
method of induction nevertheless begins 
with observation. A similar view of sci-
entifi c method was held by Einstein, who 
emphasized that “All knowledge of real-
ity starts from experience and ends in it” 
(Einstein, 1935, p.133), and also “New 
theories are fi rst of all necessary when we 
encounter new facts which cannot be ‘ex-
plained’ by existing theories” (Einstein, 
quoted in Musser, 2004, p. 88). Closer to 
home, the great physical oceanographer 
Henry Stommel wrote: “The chief source 
of ideas in oceanography comes, I think, 
from new observations. … Most theories 
are about observations that have already 
been made” (Stommel, 1989, p.49). Es-
tablishing cause is the ultimate scientifi c 
prize, but it is often new and exciting 
observations that lead us to conjecture 
hypotheses for this purpose. 
I agree with Peter Medawar that hav-
ing ideas (i.e., asking the right questions) 
is the scientist’s greatest accomplishment, 
whereas, although important and exact-
ing, the working out of these ideas is but 
a lesser occupation (Medawar, 1967). 
However there is still so much that we 
do not understand about the oceans that 
it is often diffi cult to know what are the 
proper questions to ask (McNutt, 2002). 
Crucially, it is observations, along with 
the study of pattern, that are the foun-
tain of many ideas and discoveries in 
oceanography. This view is counter to 
much of the contemporary literature on 
the philosophy of science which, in my 
opinion, puts too much emphasis on 
hypothesis-testing as the quintessential 
scientifi c activity. “So what?” I hear you 
say—most scientists pay little or no at-
tention to the arguments of armchair 
philosophers. Ocean science is seriously 
expensive. The inductive approach, un-
like hypothesis-driven science, often 
cannot be neatly packaged into clearly 
achievable goals with specifi c targets to 
be delivered within a fi xed time frame. 
It therefore behoves scientists to be able 
to elaborate their arguments as to why 
such science is not just worthwhile, but 
essential. I have presented the case here 
that large-scale observational programs, 
with emphasis on diversity of measure-
ments and expansive coverage in both 
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space and time, are necessary in order to 
understand and predict the complex dy-
namics of ocean systems. Targeted, hy-
pothesis-driven studies are of course also 
important. Thankfully, oceanography 
as a discipline is fl ourishing. Large in-
ternational, multidisciplinary programs 
are very much to the fore. The vision of 
a network of ocean observatories moves 
steadily closer to becoming reality. On-
going improvements in technology are 
enhancing the range of measurements 
that are carried out. And the time-series 
stations continue unabated. The effort 
is great, but entirely worthwhile in order 
to unlock the many secrets of the mighty 
ocean systems that infl uence and sustain 
life on our planet. 
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